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ABSTRACT 
"Help me! Save me! Please!” Imagine that you witness an urgent situation and call 119, the 
emergency call number in the Republic of Korea (hereafter “Korea”). What if the emergency 
services team arrived on-site within six minutes, already recognized the situation and immediately 
began taking action? 
Daejeon, Korea’s fifth-largest city, successfully improved the quality and efficiency of its 
urban public services with a smart solution. Daejeon was the first city in Korea to integrate 
Information and Communications Technology (hereafter “ICT”) infrastructure such as municipal 
networks and Closed-Circuit Televisions (hereafter “CCTV”) at the metropolitan level. By 2013, 
Daejeon opened the Daejeon Smart City Operation Center, persuading relevant agencies on the 
need for equity in urban services and sustainably operating ICT devices. The relevant institutes 
combined their budgets and 10 departments with similar responsibilities from different 
organizations joined the center. Soon after, the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, and Transport 
(hereafter “MOLIT”) selected Daejeon as its research and development pilot smart city in 2014. 
The Daejeon local government and the national government worked together to introduce and 
customize the integration platform that connected five safety services for citizens. This 
collaborative work filled the gap of local government’s lack of authority or financial capacity to 
accomplish its smart city goals with technical, financial, and institutional support from the national 
government. 
From 2015 to 2017, the average response time for 119 emergencies in Daejeon decreased 
from about seven and a half minutes to less than six minutes. The city’s crime decreased by about 
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5% and the arrest rate increased by about 7.7% over the same period. As of 2019, 49 local 
governments in Korea had adopted Daejeon’s “smart city” model. 
 
Key words: Cooperation, Collaboration, Smart Emergency Response System, Crime, Disaster, 
Urban management, Smart City, ICT, CCTVs, Daejeon Local Government 
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I. Introduction 
A number of key smart city pilot projects in Korea have taken place in Daejeon, the fifth 
largest city in the country with a population of 1.5 million. Daejeon is undoubtedly not a globally 
well-known city, yet it is one of Korea’s frontrunner in developing and implementing smart city 
solutions, together with the country’s more notable cities such as Seoul (the capital city), Busan 
(the second largest city), and Sejong (the new administrative capital). How did the local 
government of Daejeon—neither a megacity nor a capital city—successfully complete its smart 
city projects that are costly and require extensive coordination and collaboration among different 
departments and government institutions? In particular, its notable development of metropolitan-
wide smart emergency response system has become a smart city model to other 49 local 
governments in Korea. What was its development process, and what policy lessons can be learned 
from the experience?  
There are two key motivations behind the development of smart emergency response system 
in Daejeon. The first motivation has to do with the fact that, in Korea, Daejeon is recognized as a 
city of science and technology. It is home to the Daedeok Research Complex, where about 15% of 
the Korean research and development funds are invested in 19 universities, 30 government-funded 
research institutes, and 400 affiliated research corporations (KTIPA, 2019). Daejeon developed 
and launched the Intelligent Transport System (ITS) with MOLIT in 2002. It also demonstrated 
various projects for the newest ICT such as the 3D spatial information system of the whole Daejeon 
area in 2007, the operation system of the public bicycle for the citizens in 2009, and the monitoring 
system for the construction site in the downtown area in 2019 together with the Korea Electronics 
and Telecommunications Research Institute located in Daedeok Research Complex. Given the 
city’s reputation of being at the forefront of research and innovation, Daejeon wanted to develop 
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its image as a “smart city” in order to bring more attention to the research institutes and companies 
in Daedeok Research Complex and to enhance the city's competitiveness, while also solving urban 
problems. 
The second motivation—reacting to the increasing crime rate and the city’s difficulties in 
responding to emergency cases—explains specifically why smart emergency response system was 
developed, over others, as the key smart-city project in Daejeon. From 1996 to 2008, crime cases 
in the city increased from 32 thousand cases to 53 thousand cases and emergency medical services 
related to fires or accidents increased from 19 thousand cases to 54 thousand cases, and first aid 
and rescue activities increased from 3 thousand cases to 7 thousand cases. In addition, the reported 
incidents related to natural disasters such as floods and landslides increased from 175 cases to 7 
thousand cases over the same period (Figure 1) (Daejeon , 2000 & 2010). 
1996 2000 2004 2008
population 1,297,884 1,390,510 1,450,750 1,495,048
crime 31,761 46,011 58,975 53,124
EMS Activity 19,145 38,813 44,322 53,925
Rescue Activity 3,053 3,899 4,586 7,092
Disaster 175 741 6,747 7,045
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Figure 1. Soaring demand for the city's safety (1996 ‐ 2008)         Source: Daejeon City Hall (2000, 2010).
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In addition to the growing demand for urban safety services, there were also a number of 
major challenges in the side of service provision. Police attending crime scenes often arrived after 
criminals had escaped to the city's underdeveloped areas or rather crowded downtown. Fire 
engines, ambulances, and police cars sometimes could not even find the location where an 
emergency had been reported. Ji, Ponghyeon, a deputy director of the Urban Economy Division at 
MOLIT, said most people calling emergency services were unable to accurately describe the scene, 
partly because they were calling from unfamiliar locations, and partly because of the difficulty 
people had providing clear descriptions in the face of an emergency1. Hence, in order to improve 
the safety of the city, Daejeon needed a solution that would enable emergency services to be more 
efficient and effective. Any solution would require enhancing cooperation between the police, 
firefighters, ambulances, City Hall, and five district offices which are the lower administrative 
units that make up the city.   
The development of the smart emergency response system in Daejeon first started with its 
CCTV center development, which requires a brief explanation of the Doan New Town 
development, launched by Daejeon City Hall in 2008. The plan for the new town initially included 
a CCTV control center that was to collect and provide video information for accident prevention 
and emergency response specifically for the Doan area. The new town CCTV center construction 
began in July 2010, but soon after, the construction company responsible for building the new 
town faced a liquidity crisis and stopped the construction work for nine months. Daejeon City Hall 
attempted to save the plan by revising the project design and adding more funding through 
hundreds negotiations of the working group council. The decision group council also held six 
meetings to make decisions officially. Further, as the city finances were put into the project, the 
                                                      
1 Author interview with Ji, Ponghyeon, Sejong, September 11, 2019 
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beneficiaries of the project expanded to the whole citizens, not just for residents in the new town. 
As a result, CCTV control center was redesigned for the entire Daejeon metropolitan city and was 
expected to serve as a stepping stone for the city’s journey towards becoming a smart city.  
However, in addition to the physical development of the center, which was completed in 
2013, Daejeon needed to have a platform to operate the center and to develop linkage services for 
emergencies. This task was challenging, as Daejeon faced limited finance and regulation barriers 
that required institutional cooperations. At the time, coincidently, MOLIT already had developed 
smart city platform and was looking for a test site. Daejeon was selected as the pilot city for the 
platform in 2014 and began its collaborative work with MOLIT (Figure 2).  
 
 
This paper examines how the Daejeon’s smart emergency response system was developed. 
Through examining the developing process, the paper also explains the cooperation between 
different departments in the local government and collaboration at different levels of government 
which was fundamental criteria for building such integrate smart city solution. Especially, given 
the context of decentralization in Korea2 and the strong national government in the administrative 
                                                      
2 Korea asserted to decentralize in the mid‐1990s. However, the faced financial lack of many of local governments 
has been below 50% of the self‐reliance ratio of local finance, an indicator of how much local government was raising 
Figure 2. Cooperation and Collaboration
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system3, it still had a hands-on many of the regulations and the financial resources needed to be 
addressed when developing the local smart city’s solution. Hence it becomes imperative to know 
how the local government collaborates with the national government in what ways to produce this 
local smart city solution for Daejeon. 
 
II. Literature Review  
The concept of a smart city is flexibly adopted and used according to its object and situation. 
Countries, cities, scholars, and companies are flexibly using the definition of a smart city according 
to the level of economic development and the situation, establishing an individual smart city 
strategy tailored to each situation. (ITU, 2014; Angelidou, 2015;  Glasmeier & Christopherson, 
2015; Glasmeier & Nebiolo, 2016; Gaffney & Robertson, 2018; MOLIT, n.d.).  
The main point of smart cities is the adoption and use of new ICT for urban management. 
McKinsey Global Institute (2018) describes smart cities as cities to respond quickly with low-cost 
to events and demand changes through more comprehensive real-time data and digital technology. 
It is to make improved decisions and progress in the quality of life. International 
Telecommunication Union (ITU) (2014) defines that the smart sustainable city is an innovative 
city that uses ICT to improve the quality of life, the efficiency of city operations and services, and 
to be competitive. Similar to the ITU, Korea's Smart Cities Act, which has been in effect since 
March 2018, defines smart cities as urban models that can solve various urban problems and create 
                                                      
its own funds for financial activities, except for Seoul. For more details on the self‐reliance ratio of local finance in 
Korea, see KOSIS (2019). 
3 All police agencies in Korea belong to the national government and use a strong closed network and security system 
themselves. Before Daejeon  launched  the  integrated working system through the Daejeon Smart City Operation 
Center, any government institutes could not connect the police network. 
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sustainable cities by incorporating new technologies such as ICT and big data into cities. In other 
words, smart cities solve urban problems and enhance the efficiency of public affairs by connecting 
key technologies of the Fourth Industrial Revolution (ICT, Big Data, etc.) with traffic, safety, 
energy, and other urban infrastructures (MOLIT, n. d.).  
This study focuses on MOLIT's approach to the definition of smart cities. “smart cities” use 
ICT to improve the efficiency of city management and the quality of public services. 
Smart cities are possible to make better performance by linking urban public services, such 
as traffic, crime prevention, disaster prevention, protection of the elderly, and fire protection, to 
the smart city integration platform operated by the city government. Big data collected in real-time 
from anywhere in the city can improve the quality of public services by rapidly analyzing situations 
and efficiently allocating resources. In particular, cooperation services among several institutions 
using this integrated platform are very effective in emergency situations involving security, arson, 
and disaster prevention and management (MOLIT, 2019). The United States, along with private 
companies, is trying to make the emergency management systems intelligent, safe and effective 
using advanced technologies. Specifically, in emergency management, Artificial Intelligence (AI) 
can predict, evaluate, and simulate incidents to simplify response time and response processes. In 
addition, the Internet of Things (IoT) technology enables the real-time data collection of the 
physical environment for disasters or emergencies and delivers the data to other departments 
quickly. That would help city governments and related agencies to make important decisions about 
emergencies more swiftly and accurately (Nancy, 2018). As such, in order to increase the citizens’ 
satisfaction and government efficiency, the city integrates various public services and cooperates 
with relevant agencies and departments instantly and organically in an emergency situation. Meijer 
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& Thaens (2016), argue that the spread of technologies brings more influential values and 
motivations for collaboration. 
However, cooperation is not always smooth. Diverse stakeholders face a variety of conflicts 
in a new environment without existing models, manuals, or precedents and repeating conflicts 
among stakeholders could threaten the completion of the task (Zuzul, 2019). Notaly, in cooperation 
with public or semi-public utility companies and local governments, stakeholders suffer 
difficulties because they work for different goals such as business profit for the companies and 
citizens welfare for the local governments (Neumann et al., 2020). Broccardo et al. (2019), point 
out that collaborative governance with diverse stakeholders is a useful tool for smart cities, but it 
could exacerbate the confusion, so authors insist providing clear assignment of roles and 
responsibilities for each stakeholder, standards and incentive schemes for performance 
measurement, and rational decision-making process would be required to success the collaborative 
works. 
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III. Delivery Challenges  
3.1 Coordination and Engagement 
The development of smart city operation system required the Daejeon to integrate dispersed 
infrastructure and services of its existing operating system. At the time, Daejeon’s CCTV 
infrastructure was highly fragmented and there was little cooperation between government 
departments. For example, the garbage management department in the district offices installed and 
operated surveillance cameras to catch illegal dumping, the traffic management department in City 
Hall operated cameras to detect illegal parking, and each elementary school managed their own 
CCTV systems for students' safety. The installation cost of one CCTV was about 20 million 
Korean won (US$ 17,000) on average, and the maintenance and control costs for each individual 
system was a vast amount of money. There had been no effort to share costs across the different 
systems and economize on their budgets. 
To incorporate these systems and implement a combined CCTV system Daejeon City Hall 
faced the challenge of coordination and engagement among a wide range of government offices 
and agencies. It had to persuade its five district offices, the Police Agency, the Fire Headquarters, 
the Office of Education, and the construction company to make integration of ICT infrastructures 
and the establishment of a smart city operation center at the metropolitan level.  
After the physical infrastructures for smart cities were established, to operate the center 
Daejeon needed a platform, a hub in virtual space where data generated by CCTVs installed 
pervasively in the city are gathered and several related institutions can access and use the data to 
provide urban services. At that time of ahead of completion for building the center, luckily, MOLIT 
was recruiting cities to pilot the platform as an open competition. The Ministry invested 10 billion 
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Korean Won (US$ 8.4 million) to develop the platform from 2009 to 2013. Daejeon City applied 
for the competition and obtained the pilot rights. In the process of cooperation between local and 
national governments, Daejeon again faced challenges of coordination and engagement. 
 
3.2 Regulations  
Korea is one of the countries with the most robust privacy laws (Kwon, 2018). Under the 
privacy law, public agencies collect personal information but are legally restricted from sharing 
this information with other institutes. Image information generated by public CCTVs is also part 
of personal information. Under this law, a citizen could ask and verify personal information him 
or herself, but not others. When stakeholders ask for others' information, they have to request a 
police investigation officially and to take complicated steps to get the information they need. 
Therefore, Daejeon local government could not enable sharing CCTV image information among 
relevant institutes efficiently. 
In Korea, the national government control security-related issues. Hence the police belongs 
to the national government, not affiliated with the local government, so the police agency has its 
own network and is highly secured. In order to establish a smart emergency response system for 
the safety of citizens, Daejeon had to connect with emergency service agencies such as fire and 
disaster centers, but above all, it was necessary to create a system for sharing information with the 
police in real-time. However, it was almost impossible that local governments request to make a 
direct connection to the police agency even it is located in Daejeon. The Daejeon local government 
needed institutional support from the national government to build smart emergency services. 
Despite challenges on the regulation and the linkage to the police, Daejeon City was solving these 
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by working with MOLIT as converged information and services are the core of the smart city. 
MOLIT made a cooperative agreement and memorandum of understanding (MOU) with relevant 
ministries and agencies at the national government level. Finally, Daejeon became the first local 
government in Korea to connect to the police network in 60 years. 
 
3.3 Project Finance 
As mentioned above, in 2010, the construction company building the Doan new town, a state-
owned company under MOLIT, faced a liquidity crisis and suspended the construction of the new 
town for nine months. Although the company was making adjustments to cancel or reduce projects 
that were being invested or in progress in other cities due to poor financial conditions at the time. 
In November 2010, the company asked Daejeon City Hall to reconsider the new town plan on 
expenses and services. Accordingly, the councils decided to reduce the total financial scale from 
38.4 billion Korean Won (US$ 33 million)  to 24.3 billion Korean Won (US$ 21 million) for the 
whole new town project and to include 1.2 billion Korean Won (US$ 1 million) from City Hall in 
the construction cost of the new town CCTV operation center in May 2011.  
As the city finances were put into the project, the beneficiary targeting was extended to the 
entire city’s residents from the residents who live in the Doan new town. Therefore, the physical 
scope was extended to the whole city area for the comprehensive urban management, and the 
services were selected and slimed according to the municipality’s priority. As the plan was revised 
to be the integrated operation center, not only the construction cost of the operation center but also 
enormous financial expenses were needed to install and integrate expensive ICT equipment.  
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In addition, Daejeon's local finance was not enough to develop a platform and smart 
emergency response system. Daejeon had about 50% the self-reliance ratio of local finance, an 
indicator of how much local government was raising its own funds for financial activities (KOSIS, 
2019).  Luckily, However, Daejeon had a chance to get financial support of 1.25 billion Korean 
Won (US$ 1 million) from the national government at the time of finishing the construction and it 
made Daejeon go forward.  
 
 
IV. Tracing the Implementation Process 
4.1 Integrating ICT infrastructures into the Daejeon Smart City Operation Center 
(2010 ~ 2013) 
In 2010, one of five district offices in Daejeon objected to the integrated operation of the 
CCTV center for the whole metropolitan city. This was because public organizations were very 
sensitive to the role and size of the organizations as it directly affected the promotion and power 
of the organizations. The police center in the same district, however, agreed on the consolidation 
and persuaded the district office to integrate. In addition, City Hall took the lead to the integration 
and persuaded the stakeholders individually. 
There are three persuasive points of integrated CCTV center and other ICT infrastructures.  
The first persuasive point for the integration at the metropolitan level was the equity issue of 
public service. In 2010, when Daejeon City Hall officials visited the latest built new town in 
Hwaseong city, which was similar in context to the Doan new town project, as a precedent 
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investigation, they found that the newly established CCTV control center was for only a small area 
and several officials were dispatched to this center from Hwaseong City Hall. It could be the 
problem of inequality of public service because the city government’s finance and workforce was 
spent on the specific area not the whole city area. Focusing urban services on certain areas can 
cause problems such as rising property prices in those areas only. Through this case, Daejeon city 
officials convinced to insist on the integrated operation center at the metropolitan level because 
the city government should provide equal services to all citizens wherever they live in the city by 
establishing and operating an integrated CCTV center that can manage the entire city. 
        The possibility of sustainably operating the CCTV center was another persuasive point for 
redesigned the city’s safety system. Daejeon is composed of five districts. If the CCTV control 
center is established by each district office for each district alone, the district offices have to install 
and manage their own networks, CCTVs, and other security equipment themselves. Moreover, 
they needed the storage spaces for fast-growing public data. It meant that five districts should have 
the financial and human capacity to install expensive ICT infrastructure and facilities and manage 
them. Each district, however, lacked such finance and manpower capacities. To manage the CCTV 
control center sustainably and efficiently, the need for an integration CCTV center for the whole 
city area, increased and stakeholders became accepting of it. 
Another persuasive point was the needed spaces for the Data Center and the Traffic Control 
Center. Daejeon City Hall and its affiliated public institutions had operated Data Centers separately. 
There was an increasing need for the storage space of public data and improvement in 
cybersecurity was increased. Moreover, overlapped investments in similar infrastructure and 
services and the dispersed information as all institutions use individual networks and platforms 
caused inefficiency. To meet these needs, therefore, the Daejeon city government allocated a large 
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space on the second floor of the Daejeon Smart City Operation Center for the Data Center and the 
Cybersecurity Center. The Data Center was designed to integrate the network for City hall and 
five district offices and to take a charge of the cyber security for 240 institutes, including the City 
Hall, five district offices, public organizations, state-owned companies, and government-
contributed research institutes in Daejeon. Because of the large scale of maintenance of storage 
devices, service platforms, and operating equipment, the center has systematically managed it at a 
low cost. This data management system has been assessed to have significantly increased the 
efficiency of the operation of public institutions.  
At the same time, Daejeon City Hall had to find another place for the Traffic Control Center 
which had located in the former building of the Provincial Police Agency as the Provincial Police 
Agency moved from Daejeon to another city. Finally, the Traffic Control Center relocated to the 
second floor of the Daejeon Smart City Operation Center. This was because CCTV image data of 
the traffic control center can be used in connection with other safety-related services, as well as 
efficiently managing storage and operating equipment. 
“The policymaking process for establishing the integrated smart city operation center took 
hundreds of times of discussions and negotiations. Finally, the integration was accomplished with 
great influence from civil servants’ experience, precedent studies of other cities, and realistic 
conditions of Daejeon. ”, said Choi, Dongkyu, a team manager of the Smart City Division in 
Daejeon City Hall.4 
The Daejeon local government succeeded in integrating ICT infrastructure and the CCTV 
center for the entire Daejeon city area so that sustainable services was enabled while eliminating 
                                                      
4 Author interview with Choi, Dongkyu, Ilsan, September 05, 2019. 
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service gaps between the existing city and the new town. To integrate the ICT infrastructures and 
construct the Daejeon Smart City Operation Center, combining the financial resources were 
required. At that time, the financial subsidy for safety for elementary school students from the 
central government made a timely appearance. In December 2010, the Ministry of the Interior and 
Safety had suggested making the CCTV control centers for districts and the Office of Education 
in the city and offered them 50% of financial support to construct each center. But, operating these 
expensive facilities was not sustainable and straightforward. Thus, the five districts applied for the 
financial support, and after that, they adjusted the use of the subsidy and combined the budget for 
the Daejeon Smart City Operation Center. As a result, the budget for building the Daejeon Smart 
City Operation Center has consisted of 55% from Daejeon City Hall, 33% from the construction 
company, and 12% from the Ministry of the Interior and Safety.  
In October 2011, the budget for installing the cost of CCTV Control Center such as monitors 
and various equipment had been secured with 25% from Daejeon City Hall, 25% from the five 
districts and the remaining 50 % was from the Ministry of the Interior and Safety. And the Daejeon 
Office of Education took 50 % of the budget to establish the safety monitoring system for all 
elementary schools in Daejeon and the Ministry of the Interior and Safety took the remaining 50 % 
of it. Therefore, the issue of enforcing security for children was handled, installing eight CCTVs 
for each elementary school. There were 150 elementary schools in Daejeon at the time.  
The City Hall took responsibility for the cost of the building maintenance and operating, and 
the five district offices and the Daejeon Office of Education covered the cost of monitoring and 
maintenance of CCTVs at the ratio of the number of installed CCTVs for each purpose.  
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In  October 2011, the councils determined the redesigned project plan due to the financial 
crisis of the construction company and issues on fair and sustainable public services. The 16 
different kinds of services in 6 sectors (traffic, environment, crime prevention, disaster prevention, 
culture, plan card, and health) originally planned for the new town area were slimmed down to 5 
services in 2 sectors (traffic and security) for the whole city area. That was because the 
transportation and security services were the most urgent sectors among urban problems facing 
Daejeon City and were the services that citizens could easily experience and use. These were 
universal services for all citizens. In addition, Daejeon already was implementing the Intelligent 
Traffic Service (hereafter ITS) which was developed with MOLIT in 2002 and wanted to connect 
the traffic service with the newly developing area. Because without connectivity to the new area, 
the ITS would become less useful for the city as a whole. For a similar reason, security service 
was needed to be connected to the new town.  
Building the center almost finished in 2013. However, officials had difficulties in the 
procedure of completion and permission for using because the various facilities in the Daejeon 
Smart City Operation Center belonged to each district office and divisions of City Hall as funding 
from various sources was spent on buildings and equipment. The possession of facilities was 
divided into the related departments in the City Hall and district Offices separately. Therefore, the 
officials involved had to go through complicated administrative procedures to get permission to 
utilize the center. The officials had to complete the inspection process and go through the 
acquisition process separately.  
Besides, the construction contract was signed in 2008 along with the establishment of the 
councils at that time. It took five years to complete the construction of the center due to the 
extension of the construction period and the change of the project plan. As a result, when the 
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building was completed in 2013, the ICT equipment became too old. Especially server equipment 
had a short service life for about five years and rapid speed of technology innovation, became out-
of-date during the construction period, even the manufacturing of some of the equipment had 
already been discontinued. The City Hall and district offices had difficulties in negotiating with 
the construction company to replace old version products with the latest products as much as 
possible. However, the construction company wanted more profit and less input even though it 
was a public enterprise affiliated MOLIT. Replacing some equipment meant the company had to 
invest more money. Hence only a few pieces of equipment were replaced with the newer ones, 
most of the obsolete equipment was accepted since the purchase contracts had already been in 
2008.  
Due to the extended duration of the project and the diversified stakeholders, there were many 
difficulties in completing the development. However, the relevant organizations and departments 
worked together to implement complicated procedures. Even though there were best efforts to 
change the out-of-date ICT equipment, City Hall and district offices ended up with obsolete 
equipment. In October 2013, the center was approved for use, and in December 2013, the center 
began pilot operation for three months and in March 2014, the center had its opening ceremony.  
From 2014 to 2016, ten similar-function departments from different organizations, four 
departments in Daejeon City Hall, five district offices, and one department of the Daejeon Office 
of Education, have joined into the Daejeon Smart City Operation Center stage by stage.  
At the first stage in March 2014, the Information Division of the City Hall moved to the 
Daejeon Smart City Operation Center and set up the Smart City Management Center on the first 
floor. Soon after, the CCTV Control Center, monitoring all CCTVs for security and illegal parking 
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for 24 hours including surveillance CCTVs around 150 elementary schools, was established by 
shifting staff from the five district offices and the Daejeon Office of Education (Figure 3). The 
CCTV control center was established not to control other departments but to support the moved 
departments in sharing the visual information in real-time for citizens’ safety. 
 
 
Secondly, by June 2015, the Transportation Policy Division of the City Hall moved to the 
Daejeon Smart City Operation Center. And the division set up the Smart Traffic Information 
Center which controls all city on-site transport for 24 hours and takes charge of maintenance on 
transportation facilities. The Daejeon Police Agency dispatched six traffic monitoring police 
officers to the Smart Traffic Information Center to check the traffic flow and the situation of the 
whole city with traffic CCTVs. The traffic monitoring police officers adjusted traffic lights to ease 
traffic congestion and instructed the field traffic cops to check the on-site situation. They allowed 
Figure 3. The CCTV Control Center at the second floor in the Daejeon Smart City Operation Center
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citizens to view traffic information about the traffic congestion section and spend time to go 
through it in real-time through the Variable Message Signs (VMS), installed on the main roads. 
Also, they delivered real-time traffic information through radio, smartphone applications, and web 
portal services and let citizens know where the bus was and when the bus arrived through the 
electronic bulletin boards installed at every bus station in Daejeon (Figure 4). 
 
 
Next, by November 2015, the Local Information and Cyber Security Center, which 
managed the data resources and defenced any kinds of cyber-attacks, was founded by shifting and 
integrating all ICT and computing equipment and devices of public institutes in Daejeon.  
The staffs of the center was set with 75 persons in 2015, consisting of 9 officials from the 
City Hall, 15 officials from the district offices, 6 officials from the Daejeon Police Agency, and 
the 45 monitoring staff. And the workers were increased to 149 by the end of 2016, 33 officials 
were from the City Hall, 14 officials were from the district offices, 10 police officers, 53 
monitoring staffs, 17 IT specialists from the contracted companies, etc.,  
One monitoring staff had monitored 200 CCTVs with a double-shift work system in 2014, 
and it enlarged to 329 CCTVs per one staff in 2017 as the number of CCTVs were increased. To 
enhance the working efficiency, the monitoring staff were trained to focus on the screen that has 
Figure 4. The multimedia of the Smart Traffic Information Center
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any activities ongoing. The City Hall took charge of the hiring, training, and management of the 
CCTVe monitoring staff.  
Daejeon has expanded the number of public CCTVs rapidly. The installed CCTVs for 
security was 1,281 in 2010, 1,594 by increased 391 CCTVs in 2011, 1,985 by increased 333 
CCTVs in 2012, 2,318 by increased 385 CCTVs in 2013, 2,703 by increased 215 CCTVs in 2014, 
2,918 by increased 543 CCTVs in 2015, 3,461 by increased 827 CCTVs in 2016, and 4,288 CCTVs 
by increased 414 CCTVs in 2017 (Figure 5). 
 
 
This was because crimes and violence became more serious and brutal, citizens have been 
calling for more CCTVs coverage. Dr. Lee, Sanghun, a research fellow in the Smart City Research 
Center in Korea Land and Housing Institute, said that citizens are demanding increased security in 
public according to the rise of large-scale terrorist and horrible crimes all over the world.5 
According to the 2018 Social Indicators of Daejeon, 49. 8 % of Daejeon residents wanted more 
                                                      
5 Author interview with Lee, Sanghun, Daejeon, September 09, 2019. 
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CCTV installations for improving city safety. And strengthening local police patrols (18.7 %), 
renovating street lamps (12.2 %), managing unoccupied houses (7.2 %), strengthening patrol 
volunteer activities (6.9 %), guardian system for children (5.9 %), and others (0.1 %)  were 
followed for a more safe city.6  
The installation of child safety CCTV was designated and managed by the city office of 
education, and the installation cost was distributed to the Ministry of Public Administration and 
Security and the Daejeon City Office of Education. In the case of security CCTV in districts, 
citizens applied for CCTV installation at the district office themselves when they felt any risks in 
the area where they lived or did business. Then the district office and local police station 
investigated and selected the appropriate location together. The police decided the location for new 
CCTVs by analyzing the data on the crime frequency and region. The administrative notice should 
make 20 days in advance to install a CCTV. Five districts each have added ten new CCTVs per 
month on average. The district office applied for costs to the national government and received a 
subsidy through deliberation. When there was a demand for surveillance CCTV from City Hall, 
the city discussed it with police and installed it with the city budget.  
The building of Daejeon Smart City Operation Center was constructed, the installation of 
public CCTVs for security was increased significantly, the ICT equipment and the network were 
connected to the center, and four sub-centers were set up sequentially. Daejeon was thus equipped 
with hardware for a smart city. 
 
                                                      
6 For more details on citizens’ need for urban safety, see Daejeon (2019). 
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4.2 Cooperating with the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, and Transport to make 
the Integration Platform and Developing the Smart Emergency Response System 
(2014 ~ 2015) 
Daejeon had to develop an integration platform to collect and utilize data, control CCTVs, 
and operate the center. The Daejeon local government was selected as the MOLIT’s smart city 
R&D pilot project in April 2014 as Daejeon needed to collaborate with the national government 
to get technical, financial, and institutional supports  (Figure 6). 
 
Daejeon faced financial limitations and institutional barriers for sharing information among 
safety-related public agencies and coordinating with the national police. These difficulties were 
definitely beyond the authority of the Daejeon local government. MOLIT which had the same goal 
as Daejeon as a national government worked to make the way to share information and to connect 
others' networks. MOLIT made an effort to set the institutional environment for the smart 
emergency response system at the national level with persistent persuasion to relevant ministries 
Figure 6. Collaboration between Local Government and National Government 
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and agencies. The cooperation between the ministries was not easy from the beginning, but after 
the Sewol ferry incident7 in 2014, they agreed to improve the emergency response system (MOLIT, 
2019). This new system was designed to link national safety systems with local governments, 
police, firefighting, and disaster agencies from a single integration platform.  
MOLIT and the National Police Agency made the MOU in July 2015. Before this official 
collaborative system, there were several complicated procedures to get the information needed to 
take action even in an emergency. That was because using personal information was a very 
cautious and sensitive matter and above all, it was strictly limited by laws. Based on this MOU, 
the Daejeon Smart City Operation Center were able to provide CCTV videos of the scene and the 
escape route of the criminals when 112 reports, the police call number in Korea, were made or 
emergency dispatches were in progress for cases involving kidnapping, robbery, assault, etc.,  
Next, MOLIT and the Ministry of Public Safety and Security made the MOU in September 
2015. In the case of fire, rescue, and other emergency situations, the Daejeon Smart City Operation 
Center could send the real-time videos of the fire scene and traffic information, etc. to firefighters 
to procure the prime time of the initial response. 
 The MOU between MOLIT and private communications companies was signed in July 2016. 
In the case of emergencies for children, patients suffering from dementia, and senior citizens living 
alone, the Daejeon Smart City Operation Center could receive their photos, location information, 
etc. from the companies to identify the location and situation with CCTVs and then takes the 
                                                      
7 An incident in which 304 people, including 250 high school students on a field trip were killed in a disaster in April 
2014, all Korean citizens were shocked  about the non‐working national disaster control system, it was discovered 
as a manmade disaster because of the high possibility of rescuing all the ferry’s passengers. Consequently, after the 
Sewol ferry incident, MOLIT was striving to strengthen the general national disaster management system. 
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appropriate actions such as reporting that information to the police station or fire department. 
Before making this convergence system, the police used to use only the GPS coordinates of the 
reporter. However, children, patients suffering from dementia, and elders could not easily report 
themselves to emergency rescue services, and it led to regrettable situations sometimes. 
Daejeon City Hall established a new division “Smart City Division” in January 2017 to 
operate the center given more autonomy and made an executive director position. The division has 
consisted of Geographic Information Team, Information Management Team, and Video 
Monitoring Team. This reorganization meant that the Daejeon local government’s role regarding 
smart cities was newly created and expanded. This was also the city's will to maximize the city's 
capabilities by rearranging its organization and manpower in keeping with the tide of the day. 
Building the Smart City Division in Daejeon City Hall separately showed the willingness to 
develop a smart city as a city of science and technology and to strengthen the identity of Daejeon. 
 
4.3 Test-operating and Upgrading the Cooperation Services (2016 ~ 2017) 
Daejeon has developed and upgraded the services constantly in analyzing results of events. 
The city recognized the hit rate by analyzing the accuracy of providing CCTV images for incidents 
requested by the police or fire departments. The related institutes, therefore, compensated more 
CCTVs into the area which had low hit rates to enhance the accuracy. Daejeon also has gathered 
the feedback from the police and fire departments and tried to enhance the quality of the services 
and to reform the way how the information is sent to the relevant departments based on the 
feedback. Through continuous feedback and corrections, each agency enabled to respond to 
emergencies by exchanging information in real-time without complicated procedures.   
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Daejeon actualized the real-time cooperation services for emergencies for citizens’ safety as 
the Smart Emergency Response System. That consisted of ① 119 Emergency dispatch service, 
② 112 On-Site videos support service, ③ 112 Emergency Patrol Service, ④ Disaster Safety  
Respond Service, and ⑤ Support for children and the aged. The cooperation services have linked 
on the integration platform of the Daejeon Smart City Operation Center like figure 7.   
① 119 Emergency dispatch Service 
The 119 Emergency Dispatch Service was to secure the golden hour for fire suppression and 
lifesaving by receiving real-time CCTV video and traffic communication information of the fire 
point from the Daejeon Smart City Operation Center. It was important to save even half minutes 
Figure 7. The Smart Emergency Response System
２９ 
 
for lifesaving as a person's life could be at the crossroads of life and death in one to two seconds 
in an emergency. This service was developed over 15 months from July 2015 to September 2016. 
When the 119 Emergency Center received a call from the reporter, it simultaneously notified 
the Daejeon Smart City Operation Center of the situation. Then, the Daejeon Smart City Operation 
Center shared real-time CCTV images to the 119 control room and the 119 control room analyzes 
the type of fire and the condition on the field through the visual information. The 119 control room 
let the 119 dispatched vehicles figure out the situation and prepare the equipment that fits for the 
type of fire. Hence, when the dispatched vehicle arrived near the fire site, the field firefighter could 
have the execution strategy for fire out or rescue or first aid. Before implementing this convergence 
service, when a report came to the fire department, firefighters received the information the 
reporter described. This service has been most often used for the safety of citizens.  
“After introducing the real-time cooperation service, firefighters working field could get 
more information on the site and type of fire. It helped to make the strategy to handle the 
emergency situation”, said Part, Nojung, a team manager of the Gung Town 119 Safety Center.8 
② 112 On-Site Videos Support Service 
The Daejeon Smart City Operation Center supplied real-time CCTV images on the accident 
scene’s surroundings to the 112 Control Center to take action rapidly in case of kidnapping, 
robbery, and violence. This service was developed over 24 months from July 2015 ~ June 2017.  
                                                      
8 Author interview with Park, Nojung, Daejeon, February 18. 2020 
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When the police agency received a report, the officials generated the location information 
and appealed cooperation to the Daejeon Smart City Operation Center. Right after getting this 
request, the Daejeon Smart City Operation Center provided CCTV images and videos. 112 Control 
center grasped the emergent situation and ordered the nearest patrol cars or district police office 
from the field out. Before utilizing this service, the police officers had depended on only the verbal 
description form the reporter. It had a limitation and misunderstanding about the situation because 
the reporter could not explain the location and situation exactly in an urgent situation. After 
executing this  112 On-Site Videos Support Service, however, the police agency recognize the field 
situation with the visual information provided by the Daejeon Smart City Operation Center and 
take action appropriately and rapidly.    
③ 112 Emergency Patrol Service 
The 112 Emergency Patrol Service was to provide real-time CCTV images on a wireless 
network for police officers and help to arrest criminals. The Daejeon Smart City Operation Center 
supported the police officers by providing the information and evidence of the route that the 
criminal used to get away. This service was designed over 30 months from July 2015 to December 
2017. 
When the 112 Control Center receives a report, the police officers identify the location of the 
reporter and order a patrol car to go on-site, and at the same time, they request for cooperation 
from the Daejeon Smart City Operation Center. The center checks the visual information around 
the location of incidence and supports the police officers in the patrol car by sharing the scene 
photo and evidence of the case. Through this service, the criminal arrest rate has increased, and 
the criminal cases have been dealt with promptly. 
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④ Disaster Safety Respond Service 
The Disaster Safety Respond Service was developed over 14 months from October 2016 to 
December 2017. In the occasion of a large-scale disaster or a catastrophic hazard such as typhoons, 
heavy rain, mountain fires, the Daejeon Smart City Operation Center provides real-time CCTV 
images to the disaster safety situation room to identify the situation and recover from the damage 
quickly. In addition, the Daejeon Smart City Operation Center tried minimizing disaster damage 
by providing information such as disasters, accidents, and diseases to the citizens in real-time 
through road electronic signs and announcements. Disaster-related situations were reported to the 
national disaster management system in real-time. Before the service was introduced, some CCTV 
images were used in these situations, and oral or written reports had to be relied on. However, after 
the service was introduced, CCTVs across the country were used to quickly identify and take action. 
It also secured citizens' safety by spreading real-time information and news.  
“When the river blew rapidly due to the heavy rains poured in August 2017, and the trails 
around the river and the underground roads were submerged. The disaster response headquarters 
identified dangerous areas based on the visual information from the Daejeon Smart City Operation 
Center and instructed the related organization to take measures for the safety of citizens. The police, 
rescue agency, district offices quickly blocked citizens accessing the designated areas and tried to 
Figure 8. Natural Disaster Response Situation
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minimize damages. The center informed citizens of the information on flooded roads through the 
ITS to minimize inconvenience.”, described Lee, Youngmi, an officer in charge of the Smart 
Emergency Respond System in the Smart City Division in Daejeon City Hall (Figure 8).9  
 
⑤ Protection services for children, the aged, and the disable  
The protection services for children, the aged, and the disabled was developed over 14 
months from October 2016 to December 2017. This service cooperated with Korean private 
telecommunications companies. In order to receive this service, citizens had to register personal 
information such as photographs, height, phone number, and special characteristics of children, 
dementia patients, disabled persons, etc., If a child or dementia patient got lost or faced an 
emergency situation, they pressed the button on the small device. And it triggers alarm bells of the 
guardian's mobile phone. The telecommunications company sends the protected person's location, 
photos, and contacts to the Daejeon Smart City Operation Center, and the center checks the 
neighboring CCTV images to identify the situation and requests emergency dispatch to the 112 or 
119 centers. The Daejeon Smart City Operation Center and police officers and emergency rescue 
teams works together to rescue in real-time. 
 
4.4 Communicating with Citizens 
To show citizens how the government was using CCTV systems to make the city safer and 
to make experience smart city services for citizens, Daejeon set up a showroom on the second floor 
                                                      
9 Author interview with Lee, Youngmi, Daejeon, September 09, 20819. 
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of the center. This showroom has also been used when officials from other cities and public 
institutes in Korea visit for precedent studies or when foreign officials come to receive training. 
The showroom has glass windows to look down into the CCTV control center room so that visitors 
could understand how the collected images from around the city and how image information was 
linked to other agencies to improve the safety of the city. In addition, there were virtual CCTVs 
installed and programs and equipment that could be operated and simulated directly by the visitors. 
The showroom began with the opening ceremony of the center, and the number of visitors 
increased gradually, and by 2017, 4,077 people had visited the center and operated CCTVs in a 
hypothetical situation and experienced how the related agencies are connected and provide 
services organically. More than half of these visitors were students, and 576 were general citizens, 
including 136 foreign officials.  
Dr. Lee, Sanghun, a research fellow in the Smart City Research Center in Korea Land and 
Housing Institute, stated that the showroom is not just for understanding and experiencing the 
center, but also for the effect of education. By watching and adjusting the CCTV themselves in the 
showroom, citizens become aware of the enhanced city safety system and watch out for their 
actions. The operation of this public relations halls is a stepping stone to increase the effectiveness 
of crime prevention and increase citizens' understanding and participation in smart cities.10 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
10 Author interview with Lee, Sanghun, Daejeon, September 09, 2019. 
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4.5 Privacy Invasion Issue 
The issue of privacy invasion is one thing that cannot be missed regarding CCTV installation 
and data collection.  
As of 2019, no data from the Daejeon Smart City Operation Center had leaked. The 
monitoring employees in the Daejeon Smart City Operation Center must pledge to keep 
information related to their work confidential and not to release it. Also, all their belongings such 
as mobile phones should be stored in a locker before entering the center. This is because the daily 
lives of citizens are exposed through CCTV. In addition, these rules legally prevent the leakage of 
any personal information. 
The national government also has considered privacy issues to design the smart emergency 
response system. The Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, and Transport proceeded with lawful advice 
whenever planning services related to the security system using CCTV. It made the assurance to 
design the security system and service such as image information provision, record, authentication, 
and network separation, etc. In detail, Korea's Act on the Construction of Smart Cities stipulates, 
the related costs for the provision of smart city services can be supported within the budget (Article 
19-3 of the Korean Act). The Personal Information Protection Act allows third parties to access 
personal information when the risk of life, physical damage, preservation of property, and criminal 
investigations (Article 18-2 of the Korean Act). When a citizen makes a report regarding crime 
(homicide robbery, attack, detention, theft, kidnapping, sexual assault, and violence), fire, 
emergency rescue, and first aid, or when children and person suffering from dementia presses an 
emergency button, the police agency or the fire department, the agency has responsibility to serve, 
can access to the personal information. When the police or firefighting center notifies the Daejeon 
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Smart City Operation Center of the reporter's location information, XY coordinates from GPS 
tracking on the phone used by the reporter, the center immediately transmits the CCTV images 
around the reporter to the agency for real-time cooperation. When providing CCTV images, the 
local government checks the procedures and keeps records of the provision. Images provided must 
be destroyed when the purpose for which they were provided has been fulfilled. The use of CCTV 
information is possible only in a strictly limited range and situations, everything the camera sees 
is recorded, and video images are stored for 30 days and deleted automatically. 
 
 
4.6 Outcomes 
The number of public CCTVs in Daejeon increased from 1,281 in 2010 to 4,288 in 2017. All 
images and data from the CCTVs had been collected and shared through the integration platform 
at the Daejeon Smart City Operation Center. In 2017 alone, the Daejeon Smart City Operation 
Center provided visual information of CCTVs to support 8,779 cases of police dispatches, 5,758 
cases of emergency, 438 cases of regarding disasters, and 142 cases of protection adults suffering 
from dementia, children, and missing persons.  
Figure 9 shows that the Daejeon city's crime decreased by 2,610 cases from 2015 to 2017 
(49,593 cases in 2015, 49,036 cases in 2016, and 46,983 cases in 2017). And the arrest rate, the 
ratio of the number of crime occurrences divided by the number of criminal arrests, increased by 
about 8% in the same period (80.5% in 2015, 86.3% in 2016, and 88.2% in 2017). In particular, 
the five major crimes, an indicator of the type of "five major crimes (murder, robbery, rape, 
violence, and theft)" frequently used by Korean police was introduced in the early 1990s and used 
until recently, in Daejeon was decreased by 3,205 cases (18,990 cases in 2015, 16,835 cases in 
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2016, and 15,785 cases in 2017). The arrest rate on the five major crimes increased by 11.6% (68.3% 
in 2015, 77.2% in 2016, and 79.9% in 2017). The average response time for 119 emergencies was 
shortened by 1 minute 28 seconds (7 minutes 26 seconds in 2015, 6 minutes and 30 seconds in 
2016, and 5 minutes 58 seconds in 2017). The on-site arrival rate in 7 minutes, rose by 15.4 % 
(63.1% in 2015, 72.8% in 2016, and 78.5% in 2017).  
 
  
 
Not only public institutions but also the private sector can request CCTV video information 
according to the procedure. In 2017 for one year, individual citizens and companies made a total 
of 481 requests for CCTV images and data, of which 102 were released to them as these requests 
satisfied the requirements. Since the center retained the video data for 30 days, there were 270 
nonexistent items and 49 and 60 cases were closed and canceled, respectively. On the second floor 
of the center, a public relations room was set up to promote the safe city for citizens, to help 
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cooperative work with public officials in related institutions, and to share know-how with visiting 
officials from Korea and foreign. In 2017, a total of 1,698 people visited the center and participated 
in the PR activities in 96 times. Daejeon's smart city model has now spread to 49 local governments 
across Korea by 2019, and the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, and Transport is planning to 
implement this model in 108 local governments by 2021. 
 
 
V. Lessons Learned 
5.1 Holistic Design of Public Service for Various Urban Issues  
Daejeon City designed a comprehensive solution for various city problems such as fire 
suppression, emergency rescue, arrest, protection of children and the old, and coping with natural 
disasters with a holistic frame of emergency services for civil safety. Beyond the previous working 
way of relying only on the citizen's phone report and dealing with the emergency situation 
individually, the developed smart emergency response system is more efficient and accurate with 
the improved quality and quantity of information using CCTVs and the real-time cooperation 
among relevant institutes. Local governments should consider the holistic approach for public 
services that can solve various problems on the whole with limited budgets and infrastructures 
rather than providing a separate solution in each organization's ways.  
Besides, when Daejeon faced the challenges of data storage and cybersecurity for individual 
public institutions in the city, Daejeon designed an aggregated data center at the Daejeon Smart 
City Operation Center rather than responded to every unit of the organization. This holistic data 
management system decreased the cost of infrastructures and facilities, operation, maintenance, 
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and the workforce. Even further, due to the large scale of data, Daejeon could work with 
professional data management companies, and it obtained specialty improvement.   
 
 
5.2 Universal Design of Public Service for Equity and Sustainability 
City governments exist for the welfare of all citizens and operate from the taxes of citizens. 
Therefore, all citizens should be beneficiaries of public services, not specific regions or targets. 
Putting Fiscal and manpower from city governments for specific regions is not a justification for 
the equity of public services and the sustainability of operations. Daejeon integrated the ICT 
infrastructure as the metropolitan city unit and executed key services such as traffic and emergency 
response demanded from citizens instead of experimenting or demonstrating with various services 
using state-of-the-art technology in the Doan New Town. The city emphasized the equity of public 
services and the sustainability of operation, not focused on the short term outcomes of the pilot 
project. Hence Daejeon designed the smart solution for all citizens and made it universal public 
services. Therefore, there was no opposition from parliament or citizens at all due to the universal 
characteristic. It provided justifying extension to other public services reflected citizens' demands. 
The developed platform can handle 26 services at maximum and the city plans to enlarge the smart 
solution fields step by step.  
“In Korea, there are no precedents for smart solutions expanded to city levels from the pilot 
project in the districts. In particular, Due to expensive smart city infrastructure, it is impossible to 
３９ 
 
achieve spatial expansion with the financial power of local governments.”, said Choi, Dongkyu, a 
team manager of the Smart City Division in Daejeon City Hall.11 
 
5.3 Connectivity and Flexibility for Smart City 
Another point that Daejeon concentrated on for the smart city solution was the connectivity 
of existing urban service and infrastructure to new ones. The newly developing area in the city 
should be integrated to utilize information into existing urban management infrastructure and 
systems. Daejeon connected the newly developed Doan New Town with the Intelligent Traffic 
System that was being implemented in Daejeon and integrated the newly installed CCTVs in Doan 
New Town into the Daejeon Smart City Operation Center.  
Flexibility is one of the important characteristics to build smart cities due to the rapid speed 
of technology development. The smart city projects should be designed flexibly to reflect the rapid 
trend change of ICT technology. When cities contract with the contractor, it is recommendable to 
make efforts for the contract with flexible conditions regarding technology. When Daejeon 
completed the construction and acquired the facilities, it was difficult to negotiate for replacing the 
devices and equipment outdated technology at the time of signing the contract with the facilities 
applied newest technology. Smart city projects should consider the flexibility of rapid 
technological change. 
In terms of cost and quality of service, beyond replacing the product outdated technology 
with the product using the newest technology, cities need to flexibly integrate technologies to plan 
                                                      
11 Author interview with Choi, Dongkyu, Daejeon, September 09, 2019. 
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smart cities. For example, a new smart city could combine CCTV and drones to obtain visual 
information more plentifully and quickly. As one CCTV can cover up to a radius of 50m, there are 
many blind spots between installed CCTVs as the devices are fixed. To compensate for this, 
Daejeon plans to install 26 drone stations in the City with the financial support from MOLIT from 
2020. It is expected that drones will be able to cover a radius of 2 km from the station and to 
acquire more accurate and speedy field information within two minutes, it will speed up the smart 
emergency system. In terms of cost, this convergence is also efficient. There are about 5,000 
CCTVs installed in Daejeon, which total input cost about 100 billion Korean won (US$ 85 million) 
but still have many blind spots. In the case of drones, however, the city prepared 26 stations for 
drones located in 119 safety centers. This plan needs about 3 billion Korean Won (US$ 1.8 million). 
Due to the large gap in cost for CCTVs and drones, when planning a new smart city, flexibility 
such as proper placement of CCTV and drones or convergence of various tech is required. 
 
 
5.4 Collaboration beyond Cooperation: Synergic Work between Local and National 
Government 
The dictionary meanings of collaboration and cooperation are similar. Cooperation, however, 
divides work into parts and then the person or organization in charge complete each part and later 
puts the parts together, while collaboration is the process by which several people or organizations 
work together at the same time to generate outcomes. In other words, collaboration is a synergic 
working style that can be done by gathering the abilities of many stakeholders that cannot be solved 
separately. It requires a complex coordination process by putting together each one’s knowledge 
and wisdom to generates results. 
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Daejeon had to collaborate with MOLIT to accomplish the smart emergency response system. 
Collaboration beyond cooperation was needed. It was impossible to implement a smart city 
solution with the situation of 50% financial independence of local government. Above all, there 
was a clear limitation of the power of local government in the situation of Korea, in which the 
security agenda is controlled by the national government level. Nevertheless, Daejeon local 
government collaborated with the national government and went ahead to solve these issues 
together. Kim, Ingi, a deputy director of the Smart City Division, confirmed that the Daejeon city 
government needed financial, technical, and institutional supports from the central government.12  
Since the smart emergency response system requires the establishment of a real-time 
cooperation system and access to information between relevant departments, institutional setting 
at the national government level was necessary. Collaboration between local government and the 
national government was one of the key points of the Daejeon smart city model. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
12 Author interview with Kim, Ingi, Daejeon, September 09, 2019. 
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